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Abstract: If the central government is a revenue maximizing Leviathan then resource
discovery and democratization should have a discernible impact on the degree of fiscal
decentralization. We systematically explore this effect by exploiting exogenous variation in
giant oil and mineral discoveries and permanent democratization. Using a global dataset of 77
countries over the period 1970 to 2012 we find that resource discovery has very little effect
on revenue decentralization but induces expenditure centralization. Oil discovery appears to
be the main driver of centralization and not minerals. Resource discovery leads to
centralization in locations which have not experienced permanent democratization. Tax and
intergovernmental transfers respond most to resource discovery shocks and democratization
whereas own source revenue, property tax, educational expenditure, and health expenditure
do not seem to be affected. Higher resource rent leads to more centralization and the effect is
moderated by democratization.
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21 Introduction
Haggling over a fair share of the tax revenue between the central and the provincial
governments is often an integral part of the political theatre in many countries. Natural
resource revenue for its part plays a crucial role in influencing the politics of revenue sharing.
Whether the issue at hand is fiscal federalism or autonomy or secession, the geographic
location and the distribution of natural resource revenue seems to play a role. For example,
the discovery of North Sea oil off the coast of Scotland has underpinned the Scottish case for
sovereignty since the 1970s. North Sea oil was an integral part of the political discourse on
either side of the Scottish independence referendum debate in the UK in 2015.3 The same
could also be said about the secession movement of the three mini Indian states of Jharkhand,
Chhattisgarh and Uttarakhand. These three mini states split from the three large states of
Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, and Uttar Pradesh respectively in the year 2000 and they also happen
to be endowed with one of the largest mineral deposits in the country. Bolivian indigenous
communities of the Aymaras and the Quechuas not receiving a fair share of the natural gas
revenue sparked mass protests and political instability in the country which led to the
nationalisation of gas fields in 2005.
In spite of the potential connections, research on the interrelationship between natural
resources and fiscal decentralization remain rare. Standard models of fiscal decentralization
assume benevolent governments at the central and regional levels (see Alesina and Spolaore,
1997; Oates, 1999; and Besley and Coate, 2003). They maximize the sum of utilities of
residents in their jurisdiction and provide local public goods. Therefore, there is merit in
fiscal decentralization or centralization depending on the nature of externality that the
3 On 25 August, 2015 Venessa Barford of the BBC writes in her article entitled Scottish Independence:
Five Unresolved Questions for the BBC Online, “North Sea oil and gas reserves are another matter of much
dispute. Mr Salmond says an independent Scotland would earmark a tenth of revenues - which the Yes
campaign puts at about £1bn a year - to form a Norwegian-style sovereign wealth fund, creating a £30bn pot
over a generation. Prime Minister David Cameron says the North Sea has been a British success story – and now
oil and gas are getting harder to recover it's important to back the industry with the "broad shoulders" of the
UK.”
3provision of local public goods generates for other regions in the country. Alternatively,
another class of models view fiscal decentralization from a ‘Neo-Hobbesian’ perspective
whereby the central government is a revenue maximizing Leviathan only constrained by the
constitution and bottom-up democratic pressure via the regional governments (Brennan and
Buchanan, 1977). Under both of these approaches, one would expect the spatial distribution
of natural resources and the quality of political institutions to matter by influencing the power
relationship between the central and the regional governments. Yet studying the effects of
natural resources and political institutions on fiscal decentralization remains on the periphery
of this literature.
In this paper we aim to systematically explore the causal effect of natural resources on
fiscal decentralization and how the quality of political institutions affects this relationship. In
particular, we exploit the exogenous variation in giant and supergiant discoveries in oil, gas
and mineral reserves to set up a quasi-natural experiment to identify the effect of natural
resources on fiscal decentralization. The effect of resource discovery as an exogenous news
shock is analysed using a global dataset covering up to 77 countries over the period 1970 to
2012. Furthermore, the paper also estimates the effect of resource rent on fiscal
decentralization.
The paper makes the following contributions. First, establishing causality is the main
motivation in this literature and the paper presents a credible strategy to achieve that
objective by using the exogenous news shock of resource discovery as an identifier. Second,
the paper uses a novel geocoded dataset on resource discovery. In particular, the new dataset
is able to distinguish between 11 different minerals4 and oil discoveries. To the best of our
knowledge, the mineral discovery data is entirely new and no other study analysed the effect
of resource discovery on fiscal decentralization. Third, the paper is first to analyse the effect
4 The minerals are gold, silver, platinum group elements (PGE), copper, nickel, zinc, lead, cobalt,
molybdenum, tungsten, uranium oxide.
4of resource discovery on the politics of fiscal decentralization. In particular, it explores how
democratization influences the relationship between resource discovery and fiscal
decentralization.
There is no obvious prior when it comes to the effect of natural resources on fiscal
decentralization. On the one hand resource discovery could embolden a central government
who is acting as a revenue maximizing Leviathan to act far more unilaterally and centralize
fiscal affairs. On the other hand resource discovery could also incentivize the central
government to decentralize in order to either expand political patronage or improve the
efficiency of public spending by addressing the preference matching problem5. Therefore, the
lack of a strong prior either way makes this a valid empirical question. Estimating a model
controlling for country specific unobserved heterogeneity and trends, time varying common
shocks, discovery history in the previous decade, GDP per capita, and heterogeneity in the
measurement of fiscal decentralization we find that resource discovery (both oil and
minerals) has very little effect on fiscal decentralization from the revenue side. However, the
former appears to induce centralization on the expenditure side and the effect seems to be
driven by oil discovery and not minerals. The intertemporal effect of resource discovery on
revenue decentralization (measured by revenue share) also appears to be statistically
insignificant both 10 years pre-and-post discovery. The estimated coefficients however
indicate expenditure concentration up to 6 years post discovery. We also document that
permanent democratization and the quality of political institutions have a differential impact
on the effect of resource discovery on fiscal decentralization. In particular, we find that
resource discovery leads to fiscal centralization in locations which have not experienced
permanent democratic transition. This effect is primarily driven by oil discovery. We note
similar but statistically insignificant trends with mineral discovery. Which fiscal institutions
5 The preference matching problem refers to the mismatch in preference between the local population
and the rest of the country with regards to public spending and revenue collection.
5respond most to the resource discovery news shock and democratization? We find that tax
and intergovernmental transfers respond most to the shocks of resource discovery and
democratization. The institutions of own source revenue, property tax, educational
expenditure, and health expenditure do not seem to be significantly affected. The discovery
news shock might affect government revenue and spending through expectations but any
direct effects on revenue collection have to wait till the start of production. The marginal
impact of resource rent could be much more immediate and direct. Using both the standard
fixed effects model and the instrumental variable (IV) method we find higher resource rent
leads to more fiscal centralization and the effect is moderated by permanent democratization.
This pattern is observed for both oil and mineral rents even though the effect is albeit weak
for the latter.
Our identification strategy relies on the exogenous variation in the discovery dates of
giant and supergiant mineral and oil deposits.6 Our dataset codes a mineral deposit as giant if
it has the capacity to generate at least USD 0.5 billion of annual revenue for 20 years or more
accounting for fluctuations in commodity price. A giant oil or/and gas (including condensate)
field is defined as a field that contains at least a total of 500 million barrels of ultimate
recoverable oil or gas equivalent. Geological data collected using modern equipment could
locate with some finite margin for error the area where mineral or oil deposits are most likely
to be found. However, it is not possible to accurately predict the timing of a giant or
supergiant discovery. Giant and supergiant discoveries are rare and therefore, the discovery
dates are exogenous. One might argue that politicians and government could manipulate the
announcement of the precise timing of discovery to gain political mileage. Both the Mike
Horn dataset on oil discovery and the MinEx Consulting dataset on mineral discovery are
immune to such possibility as the discovery dates that they report are independently verified
6 Our identification strategy is shared by Cotet and Tsui (2013), Lei and Michaels (2014), and Arezki et
al. (2014). These studies use giant oil discovery as an exogenous news shock to identify the effect of oil on
conflict and other macroeconomic variables.
6and documented using multiple industry sources and not just government records.
Exploration effort could drive resource discovery in a country. We control for
exploration effort by introducing a past discovery variable in our specification. The past
discovery variable accounts for any discovery of natural resources in that country during the
previous decade. Resource discovery could also be driven by country specific time varying
factors. We account for such possibility by controlling for country specific trends. We also
estimate logit models with resource discovery as the dependent variable and find that no
macroeconomic and political variables predict resource discovery. These issues are discussed
further in section 3.
The literature on natural resources and fiscal decentralization is surprisingly small
even though one would expect natural resources to play a role in the bargaining game over
fiscal control between the central and the provincial governments. To the best of our
knowledge, ours is the first systematic empirical study of the effects of natural resource
discovery and rent on fiscal decentralization. However, there is a sizeable literature on the
determinants of fiscal decentralization. This literature is dominated by cross-section studies,
which identify numerous time-invariant determinants of fiscal decentralization. These include
colonial history, federal status, taste heterogeneity and geographical size. For example,
Alesina et al. (1996) and Panizza (1999) presents theoretical models of fiscal decentralization
which predicts democracy; high income per capita; country size; and taste heterogeneity
across regions within a country leads to fiscal decentralization. These predictions are then
confirmed by estimating regression models using cross-section data. In contrast, Pommerehne
(1977) and Bodman and Ford (2006) finds in cross-section datasets population density to be
positively related to fiscal decentralization.
There is also a sizeable literature on the effectiveness of fiscal decentralization. For
example, in a more recent study Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya (2007) test the effectiveness of
7fiscal decentralization on economic growth, quality of government, and public goods
provision using cross-section and panel data from a sample of 75 developing and transitional
economies over 25 years. Their work is an empirical test of the Riker (1964) theory that the
results of fiscal decentralization depends on the degree of political centralization. Indeed they
find empirical support for the Riker theory. In a related paper Blanchard and Shleifer (2001)
examine the effect of fiscal federalism under political centralization.
Our paper is related to a large theoretical literature on fiscal decentralization.
Lockwood (2005) presents an excellent survey of this literature. The standard model in this
literature assumes that all levels of government are utility maximizing benevolent social
planners. This approach is underpinned by the pioneering work of Oates (1972) and since
developed by a number of authors. In contrast the political economy approach stems from the
work of ‘Brennan and Buchanan’. They view the process of fiscal decentralization as the
imposition of democratic control on the central government which is a revenue maximizing
Leviathan.
Our paper is also related to a large literature on resource curse. This literature notes
that resource rich countries on average grow much slower than resource poor countries7.
Subsequent studies have argued that whether natural resources are a curse or a blessing
depends on country-specific circumstances especially institutional quality (eg., Mehlum et al.,
2006; Bhattacharyya and Hodler, 2010, 2014; Bhattacharyya and Collier, 2014), natural
resource type (Isham et al., 2005) and ethnic fractionalisation (Hodler, 2006).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses the empirical
strategy and data. Section 3 presents evidence on the effects of resource discovery and rent on
fiscal decentralization. It also examines the intertemporal effects of resource discovery on
fiscal decentralization, how democratization affects the relationship between resource
7 See van der Ploeg (2011) for a survey of this literature.
8discovery and fiscal decentralization, and any potential heterogeneity in the relationship
across resource types (oil and minerals) and fiscal commitments (transfers, property tax,
education, health etc.). Section 4 concludes.
2 Empirical Strategy
We use a panel dataset covering 77 countries observed over the period 1970 to 2012.8 To
estimate the effects of resource discovery on fiscal decentralization, we use the following
model:
1 1 2= 10it j i it j it it itt i itDFD t M RD Y" "" " " "" " % "X (1)
where it jFD " is the fiscal decentralization variable in country i in the year t j" , i is the
country fixed effects, t is a year dummy variable controlling for time varying common
shocks, it are country specific time trends. it jM " is a method dummy variable which takes
the value 1 if the fiscal decentralization indicator is reported on accrual basis and 0 if it is
reported using cash basis. The method dummy accounts for any potential systematic variation
in the data due to the definition of fiscal decentralization. Note that itRD is an indicator of
resource discovery in country i in year t and 10itYD is the number of years with resource
discoveries in the last ten years (from 10t # to 1t # ). The 10itYD variable accounts for
discovery effort and past history of discovery. We also control for additional covariates
including GDP per capita. This is represented by the vector itX . We estimate this model for
different leads and lags j , where in most cases {2, 4,6,8,10}j - .
We are primarily interested in the effect of a new giant discovery itRD on it jFD " . Our
coefficient of interest is 1 which presents the marginal effect of resource discovery on fiscal
decentralization.
8 Due to data limitations, not all specifications cover 77 countries. In most specifications, the panel is
unbalanced. Appendix A1 presents a list of countries included in the sample.
9Our main dependent variable is fiscal decentralization it jFD " . Fiscal decentralization
refers to the degree of fiscal activity ceded by the central government to lower levels of
government. Fiscal activity comprises of two main components: revenue and expenditure.
Revenue captures the total cash inflow that pass through a given level of government, and
expenditure captures the total cash outlay by a given level of government. The two
components are closely related, with a correlation coefficient of 0.96. Given their importance,
the existing literature tends to base their measures of fiscal decentralization on revenue and
expenditure data. On the revenue side, we define the variable Revenue Share as the
subnational share of total government revenue expressed in percentages. On the expenditure
side the variable Expenditure Share is defined as the subnational share of total government
expenditure expressed in percentages. An increase in the share of subnational expenditure or
revenue indicates a more decentralized fiscal system. Figures 1 and 2 presents a plot of the
Revenue and Expenditure Share data respectively averaged over the sample period 1970-
2012.
If the Neo-Hobbesian perspective of Brennan and Buchanan holds then we would
expect resource discovery to encourage centralization and hence a negative and statistically
significant 1 . In contrast, in a standard model with benevolent governments one would
expect that post resource discovery the central government would align fiscal affairs with
local preferences and hence encourage decentralization. This would imply a positive and
statistically significant 1 .
Computing cross-nationally comparable fiscal indicators require data that breaks
down general government into its different levels. Thus, we rely exclusively on the World
Bank’s Database of Fiscal Decentralisation Indicators, which constructs its measures using
data from the IMF’s Government Finance Statistics (GFS) database. The GFS provides a
framework that distinguishes between three tiers of government; central, state or provincial,
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and local. This is an essential distinction in the decentralization context with the latter two
tiers comprising the subnational level. The database is available from the World Bank’s
Decentralization and Sub-National Regional Economics Thematic Group, which has
prepared over a dozen indicators, breaking down revenues and expenditures by type and
function. This database provides a snapshot of state and local finances in 140 countries over
the period 1970-2012. 9
The GFS was originally prepared using the cash method of accounting. However, in
2001 it was recommended that the GFS should be prepared on an accrual basis in addition to
the former method. This is due to the reality that, in practice, many macroeconomic datasets
including national accounts in many countries is constructed using the accrual method.
Accrual basis recording is a method in which “the time assigned to flows is when economic
value is created, transformed, exchanged, transferred, or extinguished” (IMF, 2001). In
contrast, for cash basis recording, the time assigned to flows is when cash is received or
disbursed. This means that there are resource flows, for example, accounts payable including
arrears, which would not be included in a cash accounting system. Our fiscal decentralisation
indicators use observations with accrual basis reporting where possible, and cash basis in all
other instances. As mentioned earlier, in equation 1 we also control for a method dummy
variable it jM " which takes the value 1 if the fiscal decentralization indicator is reported on
accrual basis and 0 otherwise.
There are various ways of measuring revenues and expenditures, including as a
whole, and as a percentage of GDP. Expenditures can be distinguished by their source of
finance (for example, own-source revenues, subnational tax revenues or intergovernmental
transfers); and by their sectors (for example, health and education). Furthermore, revenues
9 Note that some discrepancies between the raw data of the GFS and the indicators constructed by the
World Bank’s Decentralization and Sub-National Regional Economics Thematic Group were found. Thus,
using the appropriate formulas, indicators were constructed using the GFS data where necessary.
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can be broken down by source, for example, general tax and property tax. However, since
decentralization is a relative concept, the most appropriate and widely used method is to
measure the subnational proportion of the total government quantity (See for example:
Davoodi and Zou, 1998; Panizza, 1999; Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya, 2007). Nevertheless
we also use the other measures of decentralization as dependent variables in section 3.
We are well aware of the conceptual issues associated with the decentralization
measures based on the GFS data. The GFS does not distinguish between delegated and
devolved functions. Therefore the GFS may incorrectly attribute revenue sources and
expenditure functions to subnational units even if they hold no discretion to determine
expenditures and revenues, but instead simply receive and operate them. As such, one would
expect giant and supergiant resource discovery to be orthogonal to this type of measurement
error. Therefore it is reasonable to expect the estimate of 1 to be unaffected by measurement
error of this nature.
Furthermore, the GFS aggregate the fiscal indicators across all subnational units
within a single tier, thus it does not capture the horizontal differences across subnational
governments within tiers. It also does not capture the number of subnational units within a
country. For example revenue sources, expenditure responsibilities and fiscal autonomy may
be distributed evenly across the entirety of the subnational jurisdictions, or they may be
concentrated in one or two. These definitional issues are typically country specific and time
invariant and hence are captured by the country fixed effects ( )i in equation 1. Giant and
supergiant resource discoveries are expected to be orthogonal to these definitional issues and
hence the estimate of 1 should remain unaffected.
Despite the definitional challenges, the GFS remains the most widely used and
comprehensive data source on subnational finances, with the widest coverage of countries
and time periods. It provides the best indicators available without significantly compromising
12
data quality. It offers data with consistent definitions across countries and years, thus
allowing for effective cross-national comparison.
Our main independent variable of interest is the resource discovery variable. Resource
discovery is a binary variable taking the value 1 for giant oil or mineral discovery in a
particular country-year and 0 otherwise. As it may be apparent from the definition above, the
variable comprises of two components. First, it identifies country-years with the discovery of
a giant oilfield. As we have mentioned earlier, a giant oil or/and gas (including condensate)
field typically contains at least a total of 500 million barrels of ultimate recoverable oil or gas
equivalent. Second, it identifies country-years with the discovery of a giant mine. A giant
mineral deposit has the capacity to generate at least USD 0.5 billion of annual revenue for 20
years or more after accounting for fluctuations in commodity price. As we have discussed
earlier, it is not possible to accurately predict the timing of a giant discovery. Political
manipulation of the announcement of discovery dates is also unlikely in our dataset as the
discovery dates are independently verified and documented using multiple independent
sources (including industry sources) outside the control of the government.10
The giant oilfield discovery dates are sourced from Horn (2004) who also reports the
geographic coordinates of these discoveries. Many recent notable studies of resource curse
use this data source (see Lei and Michaels, 2014 and Arezki et al., 2014). The discovery
dates of giant and major mineral deposits are sourced from MinEx Consulting which reports
the geographic coordinates of such events over the period 1950 to 2012. Note that we also
present estimates of oil and mineral discoveries separately in section 3.
In addition to the agenda of documenting the direct effects of resource discovery on
fiscal decentralization, we are also interested in how democratization affects the relationship
between resource discovery and fiscal decentralization. Hence, we estimate the following
10 Arezki et al. (2014) and Lei and Michaels (2014) presents a discussion on this issue.
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equation.
1 2 4 53= 10it i it it it it itt i it it itDFD t M RD D RD D Y" " " "" " " , " % "X (2)
where itD is the democratization variable in country i in the year t . We are primarily
interested in how the quality of political institutions affects the relationship between new
giant resource discovery itRD and itFD . Hence our coefficients of interest here are 2 and
4 as the marginal effect of resource discovery on fiscal decentralization in this specification
is 2 4 itD" given the level of democratization.
We follow Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005), Bhattacharyya (2013), and Bhattacharyya
and Hodler (2015) and code the democratization itD variable as a treatment variable. The
democracy measure used to code the itD treatment is the Polity2 score from the Polity IV
database, which is described by Marshall and Jaggers (2002). This database reports
democracy and autocracy scores, which both vary between 0 and 10 with 10 being the most
democratic or most autocratic, respectively. The democracy score measures competition and
openness in the electoral process, and the autocracy score measures suppression of
competitiveness over executive recruitment, lack of constraints on the executive, and
regulation of participation. The Polity2 score is the difference between democracy and
autocracy scores which runs between -10 and +10. Following Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005)
and Bhattacharyya and Hodler (2015) we define democratization 1itD $ in a country if its
POLITY2 score turns from negative to positive. One could argue that a positive POLITY2
score is too low a threshold for democratization as most permanent democratic transitions
occur at higher scores. To account for the potential influence of a 0 threshold, we also test the
robustness of our result with a democratization threshold of POLITY2 = 5 and find that the
results are qualitatively unaffected.11
11 Not reported here but are available upon request.
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We consider two types of democratization: First, we consider democratization
episodes that are not subsequently reversed. They are denoted by the treatment
Democratization (permament) in the result tables12. Second, we consider both temporary and
permanent democratization episodes that last at least four years, as we expect that it takes
time for democratic change to influence fiscal decentralization. They are denoted by the
treatment Democratization (all) in the result tables. In situations where the democratic change
last less than four years, we ignore such change and code it as if it did not occur.
Furthermore, following Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005) we also discard democratic change that
took place in the last three years of the sample. The Democratization variable in such
situations is set to be missing.
One could argue that the actual revenue stream from natural resources is more
important for fiscal decentralization than the resource discovery induced news shock.
Therefore, it is worthwhile examining the effect of resource rent on decentralization. Hence
we replace the resource discovery variable in equations (1) and (2) by resource rent and re-
estimate the models.
The data on natural resource rents is obtained from the World Bank’s Changing
Wealth of Nations Dataset. The dataset covers 214 countries over the period 1970 to 2012.
The rent obtained from a particular commodity is calculated as its world price minus the
average extraction or harvesting cost, with both components measured in current US dollars.
The unit rents are then multiplied by the physical quantities harvested or extracted by the
country to give the total rents for the commodity. To construct total resource rents, we
aggregate the rents of individual commodities for a country and a particular year, assuming
zero values for missing data points on individual commodities. We then divide the resource
rents by GDP (in current US dollars) and express them as a share. This is in line with several
12 For a full list of countries that experienced permanent democratization see Appendix A2.
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prominent empirical papers (see, for example, Ross, 2001; Mehlum et al., 2006; and
Bhattacharyya and Hodler, 2010). The variable captures the relative importance of resources
in the domestic economy.
Normalizing the resource rent variable by GDP could introduce reverse causality
challenges. Therefore, we instrument the resource rent variable by international commodity
price. The international commodity price variable is sourced from a dataset by Burke and
Leigh (2010). The authors construct an index for a commodity export bundle of 50
commodities - 35 of which are agricultural commodities and 15 non-agricultural
commodities. To create the index, the authors obtain annual world commodity prices from
the International Financial Statistics (IFS) database of the IMF, and deflate these prices using
the export unit value. The deflated prices are then aggregated across the 50 commodities to
create an annual price index. These indices are arithmetically weighted using the 1995
commodity export shares to construct the country-specific commodity export price index.
Other variables used in the study are: oil and mineral rents and GDP per capita.
Tables 1 and 2 reports summary statistics on the key variables and Appendix A3 presents
detailed definition of variables.13
3 Evidence
3.1 Do Economic Factors Predict Resource Discovery?
How random is the timing of resource discovery? To what extent economic factors influence
the timing of giant resource discoveries? In table 3 we test the predictive power of the
economic factors when it comes to the timing of resource discoveries. In particular, using a
logit fixed effects model which also controls for year dummies and country specific linear
trend we find that growth in GDP per capita, lag of growth in GDP per capita, international
13We also check for stationarity of the fiscal decentralization and resource rent variables using the
Levin–Lin–Chu and the Harris–Tzavalis variety of unit root tests. Both tests account for bias emanating from
cross-sectional association. We find these variables to be stationary.
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commodity price, investment as a share of GDP, and government expenditure as a share of
GDP have very little predictive power over the timing of giant resource discoveries. These
results are reported in columns 1-5 of the table. In column 6 we further check whether the
results change if all variable (except lag of growth in GDP per capita) are included
simultaneously into the specification. The result remains unaffected. This is suggestive that
the timing of giant and supergiant resource discoveries is largely orthogonal and on average
is not affected by the underlying economic factors in the country.
3.2 Natural Resource Discovery and Fiscal Decentralization
Natural resource discovery could lead to fiscal decentralization under preference
heterogeneity if both the central and provincial governments are utility maximizing
benevolent actors acting on behalf of their citizens. Alternatively, it could also encourage
centralization if the central government is revenue hungry and unconstrained. Therefore, the
conflicting theoretical claims outlined above makes an open empirical question.
In table 4 we take the conflicting theories to the data and test our canonical empirical
model outlined in equation 1. Columns 1 – 3 use revenue share as the dependent variable
which measures the subnational contribution to total government revenue. Higher subnational
share of government revenue would imply more revenue decentralization. In a sample of 72
countries covering the period 1970 to 2012 we do not find any evidence of revenue
centralization or decentralization. This no effect result is uniform across the type of resources
– oil and minerals. However, the story is somewhat different when it comes to expenditure.
Columns 4 – 6 examine the average effect of resource discovery on the subnational share of
government expenditure. We find that resource discovery on average reduces the subnational
share of expenditure by 1.93 percent. For example, the actual difference in the degree of
expenditure decentralization between Japan and Germany over the period 1970 to 2012 is
about (41.53 - 38.81) = 2.72 percent. Therefore, to put this into perspective our model
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predicts if Japan discovers a giant or supergiant resource deposit then her subnational share of
expenditure would decline and would be 71 percent close to the level of Germany. In
columns 5 and 6 we test the effects of oil and mineral discovery and find that the
centralization effect is driven by oil and not minerals.
Discovery news shock is also likely to have a lasting effect. Hence, we look at the
intertemporal effect of news shock in figure 3. The left hand panel presents intertemporal
effects of resource discovery on the revenue share whereas the right hand panel focuses on
the expenditure share. We trace any potential effect 10 years pre and post discovery. We find
that the resource discovery news shock do now have any contemporaneous or lasting effect
on the subnational share of revenue. However, we observe up to six years of statistically
significant concentration in the subnational share of expenditure post discovery. This is
suggestive that the spending decisions of the central government are more sensitive towards
discovery news shocks than the revenue collection decisions. A plausible explanation could
be that the central government prefers to be in control of overall spending post discovery
news shock to prevent subnational government overspend.
3.3 The Political Economy of Natural Resource Discovery and Fiscal Decentralization
As we have indicated earlier, the relationship between natural resources and fiscal
decentralization could be influenced by the quality and nature of political institutions. In
other words, if the central government is indeed revenue maximizing Leviathan then only
political constrains can prevent it from revenue grabbing. To test this theory in table 5 we
introduce the interaction term between resource discovery and democratization variables. We
consider two types of democratization episodes based on the Polity2 measure. The first
definition includes permanent democratization episodes (positive Polity2 score) only
whereby the countries do not switch back to autocracy (negative Polity2 score). Most post-
Soviet Eastern European countries would fit this definition. The second definition includes
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both permanent and temporary democratization episodes. Temporary democratization is
defined as countries switching to a positive Polity2 score for at least 4 years and then
switching back to a negative score. Many developing countries in Latin America and Africa
would fit this characterization.
In column 1 we find that resource discovery reduces the subnational share of revenue
by 5.7 percent but this concentration effect is reversed by permanent democratization. The
net effect of the discovery news shock for countries that permanently democratized is 6.86 –
5.70 = 1.16 percent. In other words, permanently democratized countries respond to
discovery news shock by decentralizing revenue collection. This pattern stays firm in column
2 when we replace the democratization (permanent) variable with democratization (all) albeit
with a smaller magnitude of decentralization for the democratized countries. In column 3 we
replace the democratization measures with raw Polity2 score. We observe similar pattern in
the data. The Polity2 threshold for the decentralization effect is (2.96 ÷ 0.37) = 8. Columns 4
– 6 repeat the same experiment with subnational share of expenditure as the dependent
variable. We observe similar pattern in the data.
In table 6 we test whether the political economy effect is conditional on the type of
natural resources. Our data allows us to distinguish between oil and mineral discoveries. We
find that the pattern is especially strong with oil. Perhaps this is suggestive of the fact that oil
is much more decoupled from the rest of the economy. Therefore, the news of oil bounty
affects potential export revenue and the coffers of the central government more than
provincial governments. Thus the central government exerts more control over oil driven
potential revenue and expenditure. In contrast, minerals tend to be much more linked to the
rest of the economy and encourage both forward and backward linkages. Therefore, revenue
and expenditure decisions in a mineral rich country could be much more evenly spread.
To summarize, the pattern in the data is suggestive that resource discovery encourages
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centralization but additional democratic control on the central government could potentially
reverse this pattern.
3.4 Which Fiscal Variables are affected by Resource Discovery and Democratization?
Not all fiscal variables are directly linked to natural resources, thus they are unlikely to be
affected by resource discovery. In table 7 we test whether there is any asymmetric effect of
resource discovery on fiscal variables. In column 1 we specifically focus on tax revenue
which is a subset of total government revenue. We use the subnational share of tax revenue as
the dependent variable and find that the pattern observed in table 5 holds. Resource discovery
reduces subnational tax share by approximately 7.7 percent however this centralization effect
is reversed in permanently democratized countries.
Transfers from the central government are a major source of revenue for the
subnational governments. In column 2 we use intergovernmental transfers as a share of total
subnational government’s revenue. A high share of intergovernmental transfer would imply
more decentralization as the central government is transferring more resources to the
subnational government. We find that there is a significant asymmetry in the relationship
between resource discovery and intergovernmental transfer share across the type of political
institutions. Permanently democratized countries are more likely to transfer resources to the
subnational governments post resource discovery with the share of intergovernmental
transfers increasing on average by 2.2 percent. In contrast, on average the post discovery
share declines in non-democracies by 2.9 percent.
In columns 3 and 4 we also examine the effects of resource discovery on the
subnational governments own source revenue (as a share of total subnational expenditure)
and subnational tax revenue (as a share of total subnational expenditure) respectively. A
higher share of own source revenue or subnational tax revenue would signify more fiscal
autonomy of the subnational government. We find similar asymmetric pattern in the data
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across permanently democratized countries and all others. However, the effect is statistically
weak and only marginally significant in case of own source revenue.
In columns 5 – 7 we search for any potential heterogeneity across different types of
taxes and expenditures. We have data on property tax, education expenditure, and health
expenditure. Column 5 reports on the subnational share of total government property tax. One
could reasonably expect a property or construction boom at the back of a giant resource
discovery. Politicians could also engage in building more schools and hospitals expecting a
potential resource windfall. Hence, we look at the effects of resource discovery on the
subnational shares of total government education and health expenditures in columns 6 and 7
respectively. We do not find any statistically significant effect even though a similar pattern
in the data is demonstrated by the signs of the coefficients.
In summary, we find strong evidence of resource discovery news shock on
subnational tax share and intergovernmental transfers. The effect is asymmetric as we find
that faced with a resource discovery shock permanently democratized countries tolerate more
fiscal autonomy than all other countries. We find weak or very little evidence of resource
discovery and democratization affecting subnational governments own source revenue.
Popular expectations command that resource discovery would trigger property boom and
increased health and education spending. If this is indeed the case then we would observe
resource discovery having an effect on property tax, education expenditure and health
expenditure. We do not observe such patterns in the data.
3.5 Resource Rent, Democratization and Fiscal Decentralization?
Resource discovery news shocks are likely to affect fiscal decentralization through
expectations in the short term. The effect of resource rent however could be entirely different.
Resource rent is a measure of actual revenue thus the effect on fiscal decentralization could
be different from an expectations inducing exogenous news shock. Resource rent is measured
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as a percentage share of GDP. In columns 1 – 5 of table 8 we look at the relationship between
resource rent and the subnational share of total government revenue. Column 1 presents a
linear fixed effects model and finds a statistically significant negative coefficient. As we have
discussed earlier, the resource rent variable is potentially endogenous, thus in column 2 we
use international commodity price as an instrument and estimate the model using the
instrumental variable (IV) method. We find strong evidence of centralization. A 1 percentage
point increase in resource rent decreases the subnational share of total government revenue
by 0.9 percent. In column 3 we introduce the interaction term between resource rent and
permanent democratization. We observe asymmetry in the relationship across permanently
democratized countries and all others. For instance, higher resource rent still triggers
centralization in permanently democratized countries albeit at a diminished magnitude of 0.7
percent. The centralization effect is much bigger for non-democratic countries averaging at
1.1 percent. In column 4 we use a somewhat flexible definition of democratization by
including temporary democratization episodes in the dataset. The interaction term stays
positive but is no longer statistically significant. In column 5 we replace the democratization
measures by raw Polity 2 score. The same nonlinear pattern in the data remains. The
threshold Polity 2 score for a zero or decentralization effect is 9. Columns 6 – 10 repeat the
same tests with subnational share of total government expenditure as the dependent variable.
The pattern observed in the data in columns 1 – 5 largely holds.
Table 9 tests whether the effect is uniform across oil and mineral rents and finds that
the effect is largely uniform. However, the effect is statistically stronger in case of oil rent.
Therefore, in summary the results observed with resource discovery as the key independent
variable in tables 4 -7 is confirmed by using resource rent as the key independent variable in
tables 8 – 9.
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4 Concluding Remarks
This paper is motivated by several case studies that have drawn attention to the potential
interplay between natural resources, political institutions and intergovernmental fiscal
relations. It is also motivated by conflicting theoretical predictions. First, that resource
discovery could embolden a central government who is acting as a revenue maximizing
Leviathan to act far more unilaterally and centralize fiscal affairs. Second, resource discovery
could also allow the central government to decentralize in order to either expand political
patronage to stay in power or to improve the efficiency of public spending by addressing the
preference matching problem. The objective of this paper is to offer an original analysis on
this topic by systematically analysing the effect of natural resources and political institutions
on fiscal decentralization. The paper is also an attempt to address the causality challenge by
using the exogenous news shock of giant oil and minerals discovery and the IV method as
identifiers of the effects of natural resources on decentralization.
Estimating a model controlling for country fixed effects, year dummies, past
discoveries, GDP per capita, and fiscal decentralization measurement definitions we find that
resource discovery (both oil and minerals) has very little effect on the subnational share of
total government revenue. However, it reduces the subnational share of total government
expenditure. Giant oil discovery appears to be driving this direct effect. There is very little
evidence of intertemporal effect of resource discovery on revenue decentralization both 10
years pre-and-post discovery. However we find evidence of expenditure centralization up to 6
years post discovery. We also document asymmetry in the relationship. In other words,
permanent democratization and the quality of political institutions exert a differential impact
on the effect of resource discovery on fiscal decentralization. Permanently democratized
countries seem to tolerate more subnational fiscal autonomy faced with a resource discovery
news shock whereas for all other countries the trend is overwhelmingly in favour of
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centralization. This effect is predominantly driven by oil even though not limited to it. Not
all fiscal institutions respond identically to a resource discovery news shock. We find that tax
and intergovernmental transfers respond most to the shocks of resource discovery and
democratization. However, contrary to common expectations we do not find any evidence of
discovery induced property boom or welfare spending (central government funded schools
and hospitals) boom. The effect is largely similar when we switch to resource rent as the key
explanatory variable and estimate the model using international commodity price as an IV.
The paper provides a rare insight into the intergovernmental fiscal relations in
resource rich countries. Resource rich countries with more representative political institutions
are far more likely to tolerate some degree of fiscal autonomy of the subnational
governments. Resource rich countries with more centralized political institutions
overwhelmingly prefer more centralized fiscal institutions. Whether a more decentralized
fiscal model would improve development outcome across all countries is another matter
better addressed elsewhere.
There is a large literature on the merits of fiscal decentralization. Even though related,
we refrain from commenting on the merits of decentralization in resource rich countries here.
That is another question for another day.
Appendices
A1. List of Countries in the Sample:
Following countries are included in our specification of column 4, table 4.
Albania, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria,
Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Rep., Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany,
Greece, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Islamic Rep., Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan,
Kazakhstan, Korea, Rep., Latvia, Lesotho, Lithuania, Macedonia, FYR, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico,
Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay,
Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South
Africa, Spain, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Ukraine,
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United Kingdom, United States, Zimbabwe.
A2. Countries and Years of Permanent Democratization:
Always democratic or always non-democratic countries:
Algeria, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Belarus, Belgium, Botswana, Burkina Faso,
Cameroon, Canada, China, Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo, Costa
Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, France,
Gabon, Gambia, Germany, Greece, Guinea, Haiti, Honduras, India, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy,
Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Kuwait,
Lebanon, Liberia, Malaysia, Morocco, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Oman,
Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Portugal, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, South
Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia,
Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States of America, Venezuela, Vietnam,
Zimbabwe.
Permanently democratized countries with the year of democratization:
Albania (1997), Argentina (1983), Armenia (1998), Bangladesh (1991), Bolivia (1982), Brazil (1985),
Bulgaria (1990), Chile (1989), Croatia (1999), Czech Republic (1990), El Salvador (1982), Estonia
(1991), Ethiopia (1993), Georgia (1991), Ghana (1996), Guatemala (1986), Guinea Bissau (1999),
Guyana (1992), Hungary (1989), Indonesia (1999), Iran (1997), Republic of Korea (1987), Latvia
(1991), Lithuania (1991), Madagascar (1991), Malawi (1994), Mali (1992), Mexico (1994), Moldova
(1991), Mongolia (1990), Mozambique (1994), Nicaragua (1990), Niger (1999), Nigeria (1999),
Panama (1989), Paraguay (1989), Peru (1993), Philippines (1986), Poland (1989), Romania (1990),
Russian Federation (1992), Senegal (2000), Serbia and Montenegro (2000), Slovak Republic (1990),
Slovenia (1991), Tanzania (2000), Thailand (1992), Turkey (1983), Ukraine (1991), Uruguay (1985),
Zambia (1991).
A3. Data Appendix:
Subnational Revenue Share: It is the percentage of total revenues accounted for by sub-national
governments, measured as the sum of local and state total revenues, excluding grants from state to
local government, divided by the sum of local, provincial and national revenues. Source: Database of
Fiscal Decentralization Indicators, The World Bank.
Subnational Expenditure Share: It is the percentage of total expenditures accounted for by sub-
national governments, measured as the sum of local and provincial total expenditures, excluding
grants from state to local government, divided by the sum of local, provincial and national
expenditures, excluding intergovernmental transfers. Source: Database of Fiscal Decentralization
Indicators, The World Bank.
Subnational Share of Health Expenditure: It is the percentage of total health expenditures
accounted for by sub-national governments, measured as the sum of local and provincial health
expenditures, divided by the sum of local, provincial and national health expenditures. Source:
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Database of Fiscal Decentralization Indicators, The World Bank.
Subnational Share of Education Expenditure: It is the percentage of total education expenditures
accounted for by sub-national governments, measured as the sum of local and provincial education
expenditures, divided by the sum of local, provincial and national education expenditures. Source:
Database of Fiscal Decentralization Indicators, The World Bank.
Subnational Share of Tax Revenue: It is the percentage of total tax revenues collected by sub-
national governments, measured as the sum of local and provincial tax revenues, divided by the sum
of local, provincial and national tax revenues. Source: Database of Fiscal Decentralization Indicators,
The World Bank.
Subnational Share of Property Tax Revenue: It is the percentage of total property tax revenues
collected by sub-national governments, measured as the sum of local and provincial tax revenues,
divided by the sum of local, provincial and national property tax revenues. Source: Database of Fiscal
Decentralization Indicators, The World Bank.
Intergovernmental Transfers: It is the percentage of total subnational revenues and grants that is
formed by transfers from other levels of government, measured as the sum of transfers received by
local and provincial governments, divided by the sum of local and provincial revenues. Source:
Database of Fiscal Decentralization Indicators, The World Bank.
Subnational Own Source Revenue: It is the percentage of expenditures financed with subnational
governments’ own source revenue, measured as the sum of local and state own source revenues minus
grants received from grants or transfers from other levels of government, relative to total subnational
expenditures. Source: Database of Fiscal Decentralization Indicators, The World Bank.
Natural resource discovery: Dummy variable taking the value one for at least one discovery of
natural resources (giant oil/ mineral discoveries) in a country-year. Source: Horn (2004) and MinEx
Consulting.
Oil discovery: Dummy variable taking the value one for at least one discovery of a giant oil reserve
in a country-year. See section 1 and table footnotes for the definition of giant oil reserve. Source:
Horn (2004).
Mineral discovery: Dummy variable taking the value one for at least one discovery of a giant
mineral reserve in a country-year. See section 1 and table footnotes for the definition of giant mineral
reserve and footnote 4 for a list of minerals included in the dataset. Source: MinEx Consulting.
Resource Rents: Total natural resource rents are the sum of oil rents, natural gas rents, coal rents
(hard and soft) rents, mineral rents, and forest rents. Minerals consist of: bauxite, copper, lead, nickel,
phosphate, tin, zinc, gold, silver, and iron ore. Rents are measured as a percentage share of GDP.
Source: The World Bank.
Polity2: Democracy score measured by Polity2. Source: Polity IV dataset.
Democratization (permanent / all): Democratization=1 after democratization (i.e., Polity2 score
turning positive). We consider two types of democratization: Treatments that are not subsequently
reversed are denoted by “permanent” and treatments that last at least four years are denoted by “all”.
Source: Calculation based on Polity IV dataset.
Method Dummy: Method dummy = 1 if fiscal decentralization indicator is reported on accrual basis,
and 0 if reported on cash basis.
GDP per capita: GDP per capita measured in PPP constant 2005 US dollars. , divided by total
population. Source: The World Bank.
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Figure 3: The Intertemporal Effects of Resource Discovery
on Fiscal Decentralization
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